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The Quest to Implant the Civilian Method in 
Louisiana: Tracing the Origins of Judicial 
Methodology 
Vernon Valentine Palmer∗ 
It is my great honor to deliver The Tucker Lecture tonight, and 
I am humbled by recalling the illustrious figures who have stood at 
this lectern in the past.1 None, of course, can be considered more 
illustrious than Colonel John Tucker, Jr., himself, whose memory 
is so fittingly honored each year by his alma mater. The year 2012 
marks the 300th anniversary of the arrival of the Coutume de Paris 
in Louisiana, and it also marks the 200th anniversary of our 
statehood constitution, as well as the founding of our supreme 
court. I thought it would be fitting to choose a subject related to 
and worthy of the civil law that John Tucker loved. He was (and I 
use this word circumspectly) a jurisconsult in the true sense of the 
word, a scholar in action, who founded the Louisiana Law 
Institute, was virtually its only president for many years, and then 
served as its “animateur” until his death. After choosing what I 
thought was a fitting topic, I happened to discover that Colonel 
Tucker actually taught a course at Tulane for many years entitled 
“Civil Law Method and Technique.” I am therefore slightly 
intimidated to think what the real master of the subject might have 
done with the theme of this Lecture. I want to thank LSU for 
honoring him and for allowing me to deliver this Lecture. 
In 1832 when Alexis de Tocqueville came to New Orleans 
during his famous journey across the United States, he was still 
gathering notes for his classic work, La Démocracie en Amérique. 
He tells us that he had a conversation with a “very well-known 
New Orleans lawyer whose name I have forgotten.”2 The lawyer 
that he met is believed to have been Etienne Mazureau, a greatly 
admired intellect who spoke four languages fluently and who had 
total command of the Spanish–Roman–French laws comprising the 
Louisiana legal system. According to de Tocqueville’s notes, 
Mazureau spoke about a fateful act of the legislature that was 
passed only a few years before: 
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 ∗ Thomas Pickles Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Eason Weinmann 
Center for Comparative Law, Tulane University. 
 1. This Article reproduces the text of The 36th Annual Tucker Lecture, 
which I delivered on November 17, 2011, at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center, 
Louisiana State University. 
 2. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, JOURNEY TO AMERICA 106 (J. P. Mayer ed., 
George Lawrence trans., Yale Univ. Press 1960). 
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Late in 1828, at the end of a session, a bill was passed 
unnoticed repealing these laws [the Spanish laws] in a body 
without putting anything else in their place. Waking up the 
next day the bar and the judges discovered with horror what 
had been done the day before. But the thing was done.3  
What was “the thing” that was done and why should the judges 
and the bar have reacted with “horror”? What was the historical 
significance of that moment in 1828? Some of Mazureau’s 
contemporaries apparently feared that this wholesale repeal of 
Spanish law was a wholesale disaster, but perhaps they were too 
close to the events to grasp its meaning. And what is its relevance 
to us today? Many present-day lawyers and students have not 
grasped its significance either because its place in history has been 
largely forgotten. Tonight, I want to place that act and a series of 
other events leading up to it in perspective. I will picture them as 
part of a broad quest—indeed, perhaps an unfinished quest—to 
implant a truly civilian methodology in Louisiana. My subject may 
be historical, but it is not antiquarian; it is ultimately modern and 
relevant to understanding the legal system that we have today.  
Before proceeding further, I want to explain what I mean by 
implanting civilian method. There are many aspects to legal method 
and legal reasoning. There are the methods of the legislator, the 
methods of the scholar, and the methods of the judge—perhaps 
enough to furnish material for ten Tucker lectures. But tonight, I 
wish to consider a fundamental objective that I believe is the sine 
qua non of all other methodological considerations. It is to ensure 
that the Civil Code occupies the center of the system, that it is the 
epicenter of civil law reasoning, so that all jurisprudential 
development starts with and comes through the Code. This 
aspiration is summarized by a famous epigram of Gény’s, as 
reshaped by Saleilles: “Au delá du code, mais par le code civil.” 
(That is, “Beyond the code, but through the civil code.”)4 The Civil 
Code of Quebec claims this central position for itself in a very 
forceful first article:  
 
                                                                                                             
 3. Thomas W. Tucker, Interpretations of the Louisiana Civil Codes, 1808–
1840: The Failure of the Preliminary Title, 19 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 57, 169 
(2004) (quoting DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 106). 
 4. The phrase may be ascribed to Saleilles, who slightly modified Gény’s 
approach by turning it around. Saleilles inverted Gény’s expression “par le Code 
civil, mais au delà du Code civil” and thus emphasized interpretation taking the 
law beyond the Code. See R. Saleilles, Préface to FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE 
D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF, at xviii (1899). 
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The Civil Code comprises a body of rules which, in all 
matters within the letter, spirit or object of its provisions, 
lays down the jus commune, expressly or by implication. In 
these matters, the Code is the foundation of all other laws, 
although other laws may complement the Code or make 
exceptions to it.5 
My address concerns this very aspiration and the earliest attempts 
in our history to achieve it. 
In consequence, I am not going to speak about certain issues 
that are often connected to discussions of legal method. I will not 
be principally focused upon the accidentals of method, such as the 
style or length of decisions, whether the jurisprudence is used 
openly or covertly, the syllogistic or nonsyllogistic form of the 
judgment, the use of deductive versus inductive reasoning, whether 
decisions are anonymous, and so forth. These are factors of great 
interest that the civilian tradition and each national history has 
shaped individually and differently, but the incidental must not 
obscure what, to my mind, is the most basic issue. When I speak of 
the quest to establish civilian method in the formative years, I will 
be discussing attempts to establish the centrality of the code within 
the legal order. 
This is never an easy accomplishment, and there is a part of me 
that says that, even today, it has never been completely achieved in 
our state. From the very beginning of our modern system, which I 
would say took place roughly in the years 1803–1808, there was an 
“inner tension,” or perhaps it could be called an intellectual collision, 
between civil law and common law. Our judicial methodology was 
almost immediately caught in the conflict between the ideology 
brought with the codes from Europe and the American-style common 
law legal institutions that were immediately put into place. Adding to 
the conflict was the immediate large-scale reception of American and 
English common law in distinct legal sectors surrounding the codes, 
namely in the areas of commercial law, civil procedure, criminal law, 
and criminal procedure. I will attempt in a moment to show you the 
common law encirclement of the Civil Code more graphically, but 
first let me describe the ideological conflict.  
Louisiana’s first codifications were, by any definition, 
European-style codifications of high quality, and yet, they were 
expected to prosper in the midst of an alien institutional and 
procedural environment. The ideology brought with the codes 
presupposed a modest role for the judge and a strict separation of 
powers, which took away the previous lawmaking powers of the 
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796 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
judges of the ancien régime. In a word, the codes placed the judge 
under the code. To any common law judge accustomed to the 
normality of case-to-case legal development and greater discretion, 
a civil code of that kind is something of a subjection, an 
undignified and tight fitting garment.6 At the time of the French 
Revolution (which was not long before Louisiana’s modern system 
was founded), French thought did not concede that the judge was a 
lawmaker at all, and it sometimes did not concede that the judge 
was a law interpreter. As Clermont-Tonnere said in ringing terms: 
“The judicial power, or that which one improperly calls the 
judicial power, is the application of the law (loi) or general will to 
a particular fact, thus in the final analysis it is nothing but the 
execution of the law.”7 France’s 1789 Draft Constitution on 
Judicial Power declared, “No judge will be permitted in whatever 
manner, to interpret the law (la loi).”8 Then, of course, there was 
Robespierre’s violent dictum: “This word jurisprudence ought to 
be erased from our language. In a State that has a constitution, a 
legislation, the jurisprudence of the courts is nothing but law 
(loi).”9 These declarations of course sound bizarre and extreme to 
American ears, both then and now. The American judges 
appointed by President Jefferson and Governor Claiborne in the 
period 1804–1808 were certainly not cut in this mold.10 They knew 
nothing of the French reformatory. They had not been guilty of any 
of the abuses associated with the French parlements. They 
inhabited a different universe. These were judges in the common 
law mold, who possessed the power of judicial review to test the 
validity of legislation and who exercised certain undefined, 
inherent powers established over the course of history, e.g., the 
                                                                                                             
 6. Historically, the tension in the relationship is captured in Edward 
Livingston’s plan to deny Louisiana judges the power to create precedents when 
the code was silent and in requiring them to make an annual “circumstantial 
account” of decisions of this kind to the general assembly. For details of the plan 
and the reasons for its rejection, see Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Many Guises 
of Equity in a Mixed Jurisdiction: A Functional View of Equity in Louisiana, in 
AEQUITAS AND EQUITY: EQUITY IN CIVIL LAW AND MIXED JURISDICTIONS 402–
06 (A. M. Rabello ed., 1997). 
 7. Michel Troper, La Notion de Pouvoir Judiciaire au Début de la 
Révolution Française, in 1791: LA PREMIÈRE CONSTITUTION FRANÇAISE 358 
(1993) (quote freely translated); Philippe Raynaud, La Loi et la Jurisprudence, 
des Lumières à la Révolution Française, in 30 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU 
DROIT 60–61 (1985). 
 8. 1789 DRAFT CONST. ON JUDICIAL POWER, art. 9 (Fr.). This text became 
the substance of article 12 of the law of 16–24 August, 1790. 
 9. GÉNY, supra note 4, § 45. 
 10. See generally Robert B. Fisher, Jr., The Louisiana Supreme Court, 
1812–1846: Strangers in a Strange Land, 1 TUL. CIV. L.F., no. 4, 1973, at 1. 
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contempt power. They were acknowledged law creators, 
policymakers, and prestigious figures in the community. When 
they immigrated to Louisiana, they brought with them certain 
intellectual possessions and artifacts, such as the English form of 
judgment, an inclination for case-by-case reasoning, a discursive 
and argumentative style, the individually authored opinion and the 
permissible dissenting opinion, and a high regard for the authority 
of Blackstone and the brilliance of Mansfield. We should not be 
surprised that Governor Claiborne—himself a common lawyer—
would call the first court that he created in the Territory of Orleans 
the “Court of Common Pleas,” nor regard as a coincidence that 
Judge Martin modeled his first law reports on the precise format of 
Douglas’s Reports of King’s Bench Cases. 
Our first judges had no prior experience with codes or codal 
interpretation. They were not acquainted with the civilian world of 
Justinian, Febrero, Domat, and Pothier, and their initial encounter 
with codification would be, in my view, an unpredictable element 
in our history.  
Let me remind you briefly of their backgrounds, particularly the 
four justices who dominated our supreme court in the first crucial 
decades. F.X. Martin of North Carolina (but born in Marseilles) was 
a printer and translator and had served in the North Carolina 
Legislature. He had prior judicial experience as a judge in the 
adjoining Mississippi Territory before receiving his appointment to 
the Orleans Territorial Superior Court. He was appointed to the 
supreme court in 1815 and served on that court for the next 31 years, 
mostly as presiding judge.11 George Mathews of Georgia learned 
law in the law offices of his brother in Augusta, Georgia. He was a 
judge in the Mississippi Territory for two years before his 
appointment to the Orleans Superior Court in 1806. He sat on the 
Louisiana Supreme Court from 1813–1836. Pierre-Charles Derbigny 
was born into a noble French family in northern France. His studies 
in Paris were interrupted by the French Revolution, and he 
immigrated (or perhaps fled) to Louisiana, taking a circuitous 
itinerary through St. Domingue, Pittsburgh, Florida, and Cuba, 
finally reaching New Orleans in 1797 when Louisiana was still 
under Spanish occupation.12 Derbigny served on the court from 
                                                                                                             
 11. He has been described as a man of great erudition and strong will, 
whose views were “as fixed as the North Star.” Symeon C. Symeonides, The 
Louisiana Judge: Judge, Statesman, Politician, in LOUISIANA: MICROCOSM OF A 
MIXED JURISDICTION 89, 97 (Vernon Valentine Palmer ed., 1999) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 12. Derbigny studied law at St. Genevieve in Paris; however, it is unclear 
how far he progressed in his studies, given that he left France in 1790 at the age 
of 21. For biographical details, see Judith F. Gentry, Pierre Auguste Bourguignon 
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1813–1820, when he resigned to run for Governor. Finally, 
Alexander Porter, an Irish immigrant who settled in Tennessee and 
practiced law in that state before coming to Louisiana, took his place 
and sat on the supreme court from 1820–1833. 
These legal pioneers were “strangers in a strange land” as 
Robert Fisher has called them.13 They were beginning a cultural 
journey. My point is surely not to stress their deficiencies, for some 
of these men were outstanding jurists by any measure in any time 
(Martin and Porter, I believe, were shining examples) and in the 
fullness of time became expert exponents of the civil law. My 
interest lies in the challenge that they faced in their conflicted bijural 
legal culture and in what I believe emerged as an instinctual 
resistance to all efforts to restrict their discretion and subject 
themselves to a true code system.  
Let me make my point in different terms: Here was a strange 
mixed marriage of European codes and American judges, and, 
whatever its merits (Justice Tate said it represented the “best of both 
worlds”),14 I believe that it was destined to be a life of turbulent 
monogamy. It would take considerable effort to subject these 
common law minds to a European code. The tension, if not 
contradiction between the nature of the codes and the culture of the 
justice, would make it difficult for a method worthy of a code to 
take root. 
But let me not forget a second, an equally formidable, obstacle 
in any quest to establish a civil code at the center of the legal 
system—the Territory of Orleans was already, even before the first 
civil code arrived on the scene, a highly compartmentalized legal 
system, heavily mixed with common law.  
I. A SYSTEM PRE-MIXED FROM THE OUTSET  
We must not think for a moment that the Territory of Orleans or 
Louisiana was ever intended or designed to be a pure civil law 
                                                                                                             
 
Derbigny, Arnaud Julie Beauvais, Jacques Dupré, Governors, 1828–1831, in THE 
LOUISIANA GOVERNORS: FROM IBERVILLE TO EDWARDS 103, 103–05 (Joseph G. 
Dawson III ed., 1990); CARL J. EKBERG, A FRENCH ARISTOCRAT IN THE 
AMERICAN WEST: THE SHATTERED DREAMS OF DE LASSUS DE LUZIÈRES 29–38 
(2010).  
 13. See Fisher, Jr., supra note 10. 
 14. Albert Tate, Jr., The Role of the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: The 
Louisiana Experience, 20 LOY. L. REV. 231, 231 (1974) (“[T]he judge of a 
mixed jurisdiction such as Louisiana has the best of both worlds available to him 
for the performance of his judicial function. He may take advantage of the 
techniques and perspectives of both legal systems.”). 
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island unto itself. The enactment of its first civil codes, in 1808 and 
1825, did indeed mark the culmination of a successful struggle on 
the part of the French Creoles to keep their old laws—their civil 
laws. That was a great cultural victory but not one to be 
exaggerated. They kept the civil law in the area of civil law alone, 
and they quickly accepted, perhaps too eagerly, the laws of England 
and the United States in most other areas of life and law. English 
common law and American law immediately commanded the 
heights on four broad fronts encircling the civil law. This 
encirclement made it unlikely that the civil law would be the 
epicenter of the overall system or even the master of its own 
individual sphere.15 It is striking that, from the very beginning, legal 
method depended entirely on the changing subject matter. The 
method had to shift in accordance with the different legal sources 
appropriate to each subject matter. A brief overview of these 
subjects and sources makes this clear. 
II. OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL SOURCES IN 1808 
It was a system in which the judge in commercial matters had to 
apply the uncodified law that merchants built upon American and 
English caselaw.16 If a criminal case were presented, the judge 
turned to the English and American law of crimes and its caselaw. If 
the case concerned private civil law, however, say a question of 
family law, he would turn to the Digest of 1808; the related Roman, 
Spanish, and French laws; and a host of French and Spanish 
commentators. Nevertheless, if some point of civil procedure should 
arise in the midst of deciding a civil code question, the same judge 
was forced to return to the cases and authorities of the common 
law.17 And, yes, there were some cases where all of these sources 
and traditions were mixed together in four languages (if I count 
Latin) spanning both legal traditions, in a bewildering display of 
competing authorities. One is tempted to say there was no “system” 
here; rather, there were mismatched parts taken from different 
systems and made to function together. How could it be maintained 
that the civil code was actually the “epicenter” of such a system? It 
was a system with different traditions and sources in defined 
compartments but with no defined center. In such a system, the 
                                                                                                             
 15. For a chart diagramming this encirclement, see infra Appendix A. 
 16. See, e.g., Nugent v. Delhomme, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 307 (La. 1812). 
 17. See, e.g., Bermudez v. Bermudez, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 180 (La. 1812); Hunt v. 
Norris, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 517 (La. 1816) (discussing the meaning of the word debt at 
common law). 
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judges could not be full-time civilians or full-time common lawyers. 
They were destined to be full-time hybrids.  
So, it is interesting to try to place ourselves, as I tried to place 
myself in this research, at the beginning of a new state with its entire 
future before it. How did these untrained, fledgling civilian judges 
react to a civil code from another continent set in a mixed and 
compartmentalized legal landscape? Let me say parenthetically that, 
in preparation, I read consecutively the first three volumes of 
Martin’s Old Series reports, cover to cover, 1809–1815, as well as 
the statute books of the founding period, to try to gain perspective 
and data. I cannot pretend to have the kaleidoscopic or wide-angle 
lens necessary to do justice to this theme. No one, I believe, can 
pretend to speak ex cathedra at a removal of 200 years from the 
events that he is describing. Nevertheless, I will try to describe one 
central episode of this history—it concerns the failure of the Digest 
of 1808 to become the fulcrum of civil law in the Louisiana legal 
system. 
III. A DIGEST MARGINALIZED BY A IUS COMMUNE 
Here we come upon the greatest methodological crossroads at 
the founding—it was whether to treat Louisiana’s first code, called 
the 1808 Digest, as a true civil code, that is, as a self-contained and 
self-sufficient statement of the law, or whether to regard it, as its 
own name indicates, as an incomplete and partial statement of a far 
larger legal system beyond.  
You will recall, and hopefully not dispute, that at the time of the 
Louisiana Purchase and into the statehood period, Spanish law 
continued in force in southern Louisiana. It was decided by the 
Territorial Legislature in 1806, while Claiborne was governor, to 
codify the law then in force in the Territory of Orleans. Two 
jurisconsults, Louis Moreau Lislet and James Brown, were 
commissioned to write the draft. And this draft was accomplished in 
less than two years and was promulgated on March 31, 1808, as “A 
Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans.” 
Now, the purpose of this codification was not only to preserve 
and entrench the civil law against the then much-demonized 
common law, but also it was to reduce the cognitive demands on 
lawyers, judges, and citizens by consolidating in one book and in the 
two languages generally spoken in Louisiana the extraordinarily 
complex and diffuse Spanish law that governed Spain’s overseas 
possessions. That system consisted of more than 20,000 individual 
laws that were dispersed in six different compilations. The situation 
was astonishingly complex and chaotic. The Preamble to the 
enactment succinctly stated simplification as a vital goal:  
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Whereas, in the confused state in which the civil laws of 
this territory were plunged by the effect of the changes 
which happened in its government, it had become 
indispensable to make known the laws which have been 
preserved . . . and to collect them in a single work, which 
might serve as a guide for the decision of the courts and 
juries, without recurring to a multiplicity of books, which, 
being for the most part written in foreign languages, offer 
in their interpretation inexhaustible sources of litigation.18 
Now, these were the evils to be overcome, but the Louisiana 
Legislature simultaneously took two steps that prevented the 1808 
enactment from ever coming close to achieving this goal. First of all, 
the Legislature made a decision, on the very eve of promulgation, to 
christen the codification a digest—a type of codification thought to 
be inferior and quite different than a true civil code.19 Secondly, it 
decided, again apparently at the last moment, not to make a full and 
express repeal of the background Spanish–Roman law. It inserted in 
the enabling act a weak abrogation clause that abolished very little 
and left the Spanish–Roman colossus still standing. This text read: 
                                                                                                             
 18. 1808 La. Acts 120. 
 19. Among civilians, this word digest generally connotes a less scientific 
type of codification that preceded the modern European codes that came on the 
scene beginning in the 1750s and on. A digest may contain disparate kinds of 
materials consolidated in one enactment, arranged in some convenient way, and 
with little internal coherence. Even an alphabetical arrangement may suffice as 
the internal organization of a digest. See Vernon V. Palmer, The Death of a 
Code—The Birth of a Digest, 63 TUL. L. REV. 221 (1988). In that sense, it might 
be compared to a far more important Digest of the 6th century, in which the 
Emperor Justinian condensed millions of lines of classical Roman law texts into 
50 books. It can be objected, I realize, that I am perhaps superimposing a 
modern distinction between a code and a digest that would be unhistorical to 
attribute to the Louisiana codifiers of 1808. Put another way, it may be objected 
that I am making too much of a distinction, which, considering the state of 
contemporary understandings and the codification movement, had not yet 
crystallized. The answer is, however, that history says otherwise. The age of 
codification actually began in Europe more than 50 years before the French 
Civil Code and the Digest of Orleans appeared. Europe had already received the 
Bavarian Civil Code (1756), the Codex Theresianus (1753–1766), the 
Josephinian Code (1787), the West Galician Code (1797), Malta’s Code de 
Rohan (1797), as well as the meticulously prepared Allgemeines Landrecht, or 
Prussian Civil Code (1792), which, incidentally, was translated into French to 
assist preparation of the Code Napoléon. Because it is unquestioned that the 
Code Napoléon served as the formal code model followed by the Louisiana 
codifiers, there is ample basis to believe that the difference between a code and a 
digest was appreciated both in Europe and in Louisiana at that time. Indeed, why 
else would the Louisiana Supreme Court have explicitly relied upon that very 
distinction in the Cottin case (1817) as the cornerstone for the “digest 
methodology” that it recognized? See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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“That whatever in the ancient civil laws of this territory . . . is 
contrary to the dispositions contained in the said digest or 
irreconcileable [sic] with them is hereby abrogated.”20 
If, instead of that weak repealing clause the Legislature had 
expressly repealed all the former laws, that could have put the 
Digest on a prominent pedestal alone on the Louisiana stage, and it 
might have forced the judges to reason first and foremost through 
the code, at least before going au delà du code. Instead, as we shall 
see, that weak repealer encouraged the courts to slight, disregard, 
and even undermine these codified provisions by routine and 
frequent excursuses into obscure Spanish sources. 
The combined effect of the Legislature’s timidity in naming the 
code a digest and its failure to repeal the bulk of Spanish laws in 
force was more than enough for the supreme court to adopt a 
methodology suitable to that of a digest, and I shall hereafter call it 
the digest method.  
The conception was that the Spanish–Roman law found in the 
Partidas, the Recopilación of Castille, and the Recopilación of the 
Indies was the default legal system. This droit commun or 
“common law” would be applicable wherever it was not expressly 
or impliedly repealed by Louisiana enactments. Let me be clear 
about what this meant—this extensive body of law was not 
relevant as merely persuasive authority or comparative authority 
(although sometimes that purpose cannot be ruled out altogether). 
These laws were cited, set forth, and applied because they 
contained controlling texts that bound the court as fully as a statute 
or code enacted by the Louisiana Legislature.  
To envision for a moment how this system operated, we might 
think of a rock placed in a pail of water.21 The rock represents the 
1808 Digest. The water in which it is submerged represents the 
surrounding Spanish–Roman law. Now, in theory, the Digest was 
controlling to the extent that a rock is watertight and displaces the 
water (to the extent that it is “contrary” to the water, if you will), 
but to the extent that it is not watertight, the water enters into the 
cracks, crevices, or porousness in the rock, filling it with Spanish–
Roman laws.  
Any displaced water represents the repealed Spanish law that 
was deemed contrary or irreconcilable with the statute. The fit 
between the two should be seamless. It is interesting to mention 
that this same metaphor of the rock and the water is also used by 
                                                                                                             
 20. 1808 La. Acts 126. 
 21. For a visual representation of this image, see infra Appendix B; see also 
Beaker 2 Image, http://w3.shorecrest.org/~Lisa_Peck/Physics/All_Projects/photo 
journal/blair/beaker2.jpg (last visited Mar. 4, 2013). 
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common law authors to describe the relationship between a statute 
of Parliament and the surrounding common law.22  
Now, according to conventional historical accounts of this 
period, this symbiotic relationship between the Digest and the 
surrounding laws was not apparent at first for some reason, and it 
took about nine years before it was discovered that the evils 
described in the Preamble had not actually been overcome. The rude 
awakening or reckoning, it is said, arrived with the ruling in Cottin 
v. Cottin in 1817.23 
The facts of Cottin are worth a brief examination. There was a 
child who was born alive, but it lived only eight hours and then 
died. The question in the case was: Did this child inherit from his 
father (who died just before the child’s birth), or did that share of 
inheritance go instead to other heirs because this was an abortive 
child who, legally speaking, never existed? By the rules found in 
the Digest of 1808 and by the rules of the Roman law, the child 
born alive should inherit in such a situation. In contrast, an 
abortive child, or, as the Digest defined it, one “either born dead or 
incapable of living,”24 should not inherit. This child, however, was 
ostensibly capable of living and thus qualified as an heir.25 In 
Spain, however, the laws had a particular disposition that, to be 
considered naturally born, and not abortive, the child must live at 
least 24 hours. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the 24-hour 
requirement of Spanish law must apply here. Since it was not 
contrary to the Digest, it was not repealed. It only added an extra 
requisite to the definition there stated. Judge Derbigny then stated 
his rationale: 
It must not be lost sight of, that our civil code is a digest of 
the civil laws, which were in force in this country, when it 
was adopted; that those laws must be considered as 
untouched, wherever the alterations and amendments, 
introduced in the digest, do not reach them; and that such 
parts of those laws only are repealed, as are either contrary 
to, or incompatible with the provisions of the code.26  
                                                                                                             
 22. See WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL 
SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (1995). 
 23. 5 Mart. (o.s.) 93 (La. 1817). 
 24. A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF 
ORLEANS, WITH ALTERATIONS AND AMENDMENTS ADAPTED TO ITS PRESENT 
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, bk. 1, tit. 1, art. 6 (1808) [hereinafter DIGEST OF 
1808]. 
 25. See id. bk. 3, tit. 1, art. 65. 
 26. Cottin, 5 Mart. (o.s.) at 94. 
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It may be of interest to note how Judge Derbigny himself, 
while emphasizing that it is a digest, twice calls it a code, all in one 
and the same sentence. 
Now Shakespeare asked a famous question in Romeo and Juliet: 
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose [b]y any other name 
would smell as sweet.”27  
Could it be that that which we call a digest might, by any other 
name, produce all the effects and have the same properties as a civil 
code? No, I am afraid that is not what the supreme court wished to 
say. The Cottin court’s position was that a digest is really a different 
object than a code, a different kind codification. Even if you called it 
a code, it would remain a digest true to its own nature. Their logic 
was impeccable––the legislative intent was to create a distinct 
object, and that object brought with it the method of a digest.  
And yet, allow me to state that there is something amiss in this 
logic as well as something mysterious in this history, and it begs for 
further research. There is, in my view, considerable counterpoint in 
the record, which deepens the mystery of the digest. Let me mention 
five points. 
A. Point 1 
First of all, the Legislature’s decision to use the word digest 
came as an utter surprise to the outside world. In every preceding act 
and resolution leading up to promulgation, the Legislature always 
referred to the gestating enactment as the “Civil Code.” Unless there 
is a hidden counter letter somewhere of which I am unaware, the 
Legislature therefore specifically commissioned Louis Moreau 
Lislet and James Brown to write a civil code, not a digest. In a 
second legislative act, it fixed the compensation that the 
jurisconsults and translators of the “Civil Code” would be paid.28 
(By the way, in a small triumph in the course of this research, I have 
uncovered the names of our sometimes maligned translators and 
their relations to the principal jurists.)29 In yet a third legislative act 
(and here we are only two months before promulgation when the 
projet was apparently complete), the Legislature appointed a 
committee of four of its own members to examine the “Civil Code” 
and to report back to the full “House.”30 It is a provocative fact that 
                                                                                                             
 27. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2. 
 28. 1807 La. Acts 190 (approved April 14, 1807).  
 29. My research identifying the translators and their role in Louisiana legal 
history will be presented in a later article. 
 30. See LE MONITEUR DE LA LOUISIANE, Jan. 27, 1808 (referencing the 
Resolution of the Legislature of June 7, 1806 and reporting the resolutions of the 
Chamber of Representatives made Thursday, January 21, 1808). 
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the “Digest” was not born until the eleventh hour on the eve of 
promulgation. How could this be important? Well, it raises the fairly 
strong possibility that the Legislature simply superimposed that 
name on a work actually conceived, commissioned, and drafted as a 
true code. Perhaps we are not talking about two different objects but 
rather the use of two interchangeable names for the same object. In 
that event the code–digest might have been as susceptible to code-
like interpretation as any other code might have been. It was up to 
the interpreters to decide what it was as much as the Legislature. My 
conjecture, as I will now expand upon further, is that the drafters, 
who I assume worked in accordance with the mandate written in the 
acts, actually constructed a civil code, but the Legislature designated 
it a digest.31  
B. Point 2 
There is some corroboration for this code thesis from a different 
angle. In one of the acts announcing the forthcoming “Civil Code,” 
the Legislature made a provision for the two jurisconsults to 
exercise continuing oversight over its application in the courts for 
five years after its promulgation. For this supervision, each was to 
receive $800 per year to attend and observe proceedings in the 
inferior and superior courts as much as possible and to monitor the 
problems that might arise in the Code’s implementation. They 
would submit their observations and recommendations to the 
Legislature each year in order “to make this new Code as perfect as 
possible.”32 In other words, a process of post-enactment refinement 
and improvement was to be carried out, and the overall 
compensation for perfecting the code was actually twice the size of 
their stipend for drafting it in the first place. Now, to my mind, the 
priority placed on refining and perfecting the code makes sense if 
                                                                                                             
 31. The clause of implied repeal was apparently a last-minute decision as 
well because it is not found in the body of the work itself but only in the 
promulgating act written by the Legislature. Actually, the best evidence of the 
redactor’s intentions regarding the designation code or digest should be gathered 
from the document itself. Professor Batiza has argued that, but for its title, it has 
the completeness, coherence, and structural arrangement equivalent to that of a 
true code. See Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual 
Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1971). The debate between 
Professor Batiza and Professor Pascal over this nomenclature and how it relates 
to the controversy over the sources of the Digest of Orleans is thoughtfully 
discussed by John Cairns. See John W. Cairns, The 1808 Digest of Orleans and 
1866 Civil Code of Lower Canada: An Historical Study of Legal Change (1980) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh). 
 32. See 1806 La. Acts 218 (Résolution Relative à la Formation d’un Code 
Civil, June 7, 1806).  
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the enactment was meant to be a scientific code equal in dignity to 
the Code Napoléon. On the other hand, why would there be any 
pressing need to “perfect” a digest that merely restated and 
summarized the civil law and left so much untouched? These 
provisions for continuing oversight are more consistent with an 
original intention to enact a true code because it is arguably less 
important to perfect a digest. And this was probably soon realized, 
[because] once the code was enacted as a digest, the program of 
oversight was dropped, and we have no record that the jurists 
received further payments or carried out this charge.  
C. Point 3 
The Legislature’s decision and the judiciary’s decision to 
interpret it as a digest of laws created a serious internal difficulty. 
There has been no comment on this by historians, but the digest 
methodology suggested by its name does not fit with the directory 
provisions set forth and enacted in the Preliminary Title of the 
Digest. The Preliminary Title sets forth in one provision a 
methodology for the judge to follow in exceptional situations in 
which the positive law is silent.33 This is famed article 21, which 
found its way into all subsequent Louisiana civil codes, including 
our present Code. That provision is of course the counterpart of 
similar directory provisions found in the civil codes of 
Switzerland, Austria, and others.  
In the event of the Code’s silence, it calls for a return to equity, 
to natural law, and to reason. The Louisiana provision was taken 
bodily from the projet du gouvernement, which Portalis drafted for 
the French Code Civil.34 In the case of the French Code, that 
provision could have filled a functional need because the Code was 
built as a closed system, and there must have been some way to 
deal with the unprovided-for case since any deni de justice was 
forbidden. All prerevolutionary sources of law had been repealed, 
and the code rested on its own bottom. In the case of Louisiana, 
too, it could have fulfilled the same role but logically only if we 
                                                                                                             
 33. DIGEST OF 1808, supra note 24, bk. 1, prelim. tit., art. 21 (“In civil 
matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed and decide 
according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law 
and reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent.”). 
 34. The Livre Préliminaire, which was rejected by the code commission and 
not included in the final Code Civil, was the work of Portalis who chose Domat 
as his model. As Maleville noted, “Ce fut aussi sans contradiction que passa la 
suppression presqu’ entière du livre préliminaire que M. Portalis avait rédigé a 
l'instar du Livre des Lois de Domat, et dans lequel il avait bien surpassé son 
modèle . . . .” Tucker, supra note 3, at 80 n.42. 
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assume the redactors thought they were constructing a true code 
that would be severed from the past laws. Such a provision, 
however, is superfluous and contradictory under a digest, for a 
digest does not involve occasional gaps; it has many gaps. It is 
porous by design and surrounded by its own ius commune. The 
gaps in a digest are foreseen and expected, and they are regarded 
as less consequential because they will be filled not by the judge’s 
concept of equity or conception of natural law but by routine 
recourse to the default system in the background.35 The digest 
methodology exemplified in Cottin is thus at war with an article 21 
methodology, which presupposes an internal, analogical mode of 
growth and development. Both cannot operate at the same time, 
and I think the drafters must have known that and probably 
intended otherwise. But, the last minute name change caught them 
off guard. What is very interesting is that the historical record 
demonstrates that article 21 did turn out to be functionally 
superfluous throughout the life of the 1808 Digest, as anyone could 
have predicted. I hope that I have not missed anything in the 
historical record of the years 1808–1825, but after diligent search 
there was not one instance in which the Louisiana judges actually 
invoked or used article 21. It is true that lawyers arguing before the 
court adverted to article 21 a few times,36 but there was no instance 
in which the judges adopted that argument or confessed to any gap 
in the Digest. Of course, they handled hundreds of cases in which 
they made routine recourse to Spanish and Roman law, but that 
was never considered to be article 21 gap-filling. Actually, I was 
surprised to learn that it was not until 1851 that the court used 
article 21 for the first time, and this of course was long after the 
                                                                                                             
 35. Thomas Tucker conceived that Spanish law was considered “natural 
law” by the Louisiana jurists, and it was brought into play in the Louisiana 
system under the Digest of 1808 by passing through article 21. Tucker, supra 
note 3, at 126. I believe this theory is unhistorical. As opposed to being idealized 
natural law that passed into the system where positive law was silent, Spanish 
law was conceived in this period as a body of statutory law directly applicable, 
so long as it had not been repealed by positive provisions found in the Digest. 
The silence of the Digest was never the test of its relevance––rather nonrepeal 
was. For instance, the 24-hour test applied in Cottin for determining whether a 
child was considered abortive did not involve a rule of universal natural law. 
Indeed the Spanish rule was idiosyncratic and not followed in any other 
European system. It applied as positive law in Louisiana without any mention of 
article 21. 
 36. See Hunt v. Norris, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 517 (La. 1816); Griffin’s Ex’r v. 
Lopez, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 145 (La. 1817); Brashears v. Barrabino, 8 Mart. (o.s.) 641 
(La. 1820); Poultney’s Heirs v. Barrett, 8 La. 441 (La. 1835); Fisk v. Fisk, 2 La. 
Ann. 71 (La. 1847). 
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Digest had been repealed.37 Thus, the presence of article 21 in the 
1808 enactment is, to my mind, clear evidence that the drafters 
thought that they were constructing a true code, that is until they 
were told otherwise by the Legislature.  
D. Point 4 
There is, furthermore, a better form of evidence to show that 
they wrote a code before it became a digest. There is the Code [of 
1808] itself, ready to be examined. There is no exposé des motifs 
accompanying the document, so we really do not know the inner 
thinking of Moreau and Brown. The best evidence of their 
intentions, however, is the document itself. If we disregard its title 
and look at its substance, it has the completeness, coherence, and 
structural arrangement equivalent to that of a true code, or so at 
least a number of distinguished scholars have thought.38 When we 
look closely at the provisions, it is clear that they did not slavishly 
copy or merely rephrase or restate the civil laws of their time. 
Choices were made and original rules were sometimes confected. 
Frequently enough, they attempted to create clearer or better rules 
by splicing elements from more than one tradition. For example, in 
drafting the articles on redhibition applicable to the sales of slaves, 
they chose to borrow French rules about the seller’s state of mind 
(this offered stronger buyer protection than the Spanish rules) but 
attached them to some detailed Spanish rules about the types of 
defects that were actionable (this produced the division between 
vices of character and defects of the body). The final combination 
represented a splice of the two laws.39 In my view, a redactor 
would have had very little motivation to craft new rules of this type 
if he or she realized that the rule would go into a digest that would 
in turn be subject once again to the very rules from which he or she 
had originally chosen. The reasonable redactor would realize that a 
digest methodology threatens to undermine every attempt at 
                                                                                                             
 37. See Thompson v. Mylne, 6 La. Ann. 80 (La. 1851); cf. Simonton’s Case, 
2 Mart. (o.s.) 102 (La. 1811) (stating that the case presented a casus omissus in 
the legislation, but without adverting to article 21, it was not within the power of 
the court to provide a remedy). 
 38. John T. Hood, Jr., The History and Development of the Louisiana Civil 
Code, 19 LA. L. REV. 18 (1958). Thomas Tucker, however, argues that it was 
not meant to be a true code on the basis of the name of the work, the weak 
repealing clause, the historical purpose behind it, and a sampling of the opinions 
of contemporary historians and jurists. See Tucker, supra note 3, at 130–35. 
 39. See VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, THROUGH THE CODES DARKLY: SLAVE 
LAW AND CIVIL LAW IN LOUISIANA ch. 4 (2012). The Spanish source of the 
provision was Partida 5,5,64, while the French source was Code Civile articles 
1641–1646. 
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originality. New rules are fated to be supplemented by the very 
elements in the old sources that the drafters chose to discard.  
E. Point 5 
There is an additional historical fact that I will mention only 
because it seems so odd. In reading over, as I said, three volumes of 
Martin’s reports covering 1809–1815, Louisiana’s 1808 law is 
constantly referred to as the “Civil Code” by the court and by all of 
the lawyers, even though, as we know, that was not its real name. In 
scouring the reports, I have found but two occasions out of hundreds 
or thousands of references in published briefs and opinions in which 
it is ever referred to as the Digest. The Cottin decision was of course 
one of those two occasions.40 If the proper title was so consequential 
to the legal mind, what can explain this almost complete disregard 
of it in everyday practice? What’s in a name? 
These counterpoints will not change the history books of this 
period, but they may create certain inferences, add to our questions, 
and deepen the mystery. Actually, we know little about this vital 
period. We have no exposé des motifs, no journal, and no 
explanatory letters. We have no record of the discussions between 
the jurisconsults and the legislative committee, nor whether the 
judges were first consulted on the naming of the enactment. And we 
unfortunately have no reported cases for the critical years 1804–
1809, which might shed light on the previous interpretations given 
to the relationship between local laws and the greater ius commune.  
Allow me now to come back to the year 1817 because I think 
we have misread its significance. It is very difficult for me to agree 
after a close reading of the earliest cases that the digest method 
was first discovered and applied in Cottin in 1817 and that this 
holding “had the effect of reviving the Spanish law.”41 It is also 
difficult to agree with an eminent author’s assertion that it was 
Cottin which “gave rise to almost limitless confusion and opened the 
floodgates of litigation. This decision meant that the 1808 Code 
could be used in practice only as an incomplete digest of existing 
laws that still retained their original force.”42 Actually, the same 
method was known and used from the outset, for it plainly appears 
in the first cases reported in Volume 1 of Martin’s Reports for the 
                                                                                                             
 40. See Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 93 (La. 1817). 
 41. See Hood, Jr., supra note 38, at 28.  
 42. A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, 1 CIV. L. 
COMMENTARIES 1, 11 (2008). 
810 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
fall term of 1809.43 For instance, in Folk v. Solis (1809), it had to be 
determined whether the plaintiff, who brought suit for defamation, 
had a right to demand bail or surety from the defendant as a 
guarantee against his departing the jurisdiction. Under a territorial 
statute, a demand for bail was authorized where the action involved 
wrongful injury to property or wrongful detention of property, but 
the statute said nothing about the availability of bail where the 
action was for defamation. Nevertheless, said the court, it remained 
to inquire if the Spanish authorities (and–or English authorities) 
permitted a plaintiff to demand bail from the defendant upon a 
defamation claim. The court concluded that Spanish law would 
allow a type of surety (the judicio sisti) in a libel action provided 
certain conditions were met, but it held that, under the facts of the 
case, those conditions were not met. Thus, the defendant’s bail was 
discharged.44 Had the conditions been met, however, the court was 
prepared to apply the Spanish judicio sisti because it was part of 
Louisiana law. I have found a number of other pre-Cottin cases 
where Spanish law was applied directly beyond the limits of the 
Digest.45 Thus, it is seems correct to say that as early as 1809, if not 
                                                                                                             
 43. See Folk v. Solis, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 64 (La. 1809); Beauregard v. Piernas, 1 
Mart. (o.s.) 281 (La. 1811); Hayes v. Berwick, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 138 (La. 1812); 
Brognier v. Forstall, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 577 (La. 1815); Durnford v. Syndics of 
Brooks, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 222 (La. 1814); Rogers v. Beiller, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 665 (La. 
1815); cf. Dewees v. Morgan, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 1 (La. 1809). 
 44. Folk, 1 Mart. (o.s.) at 68 (“It seems, therefore, that the law of Spain 
alone may be invoked by the plaintiffs, and as they have not complied with what 
it requires, I am bound to say that they cannot have the benefit of it.”). 
 45. Beauregard, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 281, and Brognier, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 577, have 
similar facts and present pre-Cottin examples of the digest method in action. In 
the latter case, defendant, a married woman, bound herself jointly with her 
husband to pay a debt to plaintiff, and the couple mortgaged slaves to secure 
payment. The plaintiff exercised his mortgage rights and obtained an order of 
seizure. The defendant’s wife resisted the seizure on grounds that under Spanish 
law, a wife cannot become security for her husband unless the debt has been 
converted to her benefit, even though she had formally renounced the law’s 
protections. The Digest of 1808 was silent on the question of the capacity of a 
wife to secure her husband’s debts. The court held that the defendant had 
formally renounced the protections, and therefore she was bound under Spanish 
law (the law of Toro) to make payment. A sample of such a renunciation by the 
wife is found in an authentic act of July 9, 1810 executed in West Florida while 
under Spanish rule:  
And I, the said Victorina Marie de Armas, renounce all laws of Emperor 
Justinian and Beleyano, senatu consultus, laws of the forum, of Madrid, 
and the Partidas, all the new and old Constitutions, and any other laws for 
the benefit of women, all concerning which I have been advised, and 
with full knowledge of them I renounce all of them, swearing that I have 
not been compelled or coerced by my said husband or any other person 
to sign this act, but I have signed it of my own free will . . . . 
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sooner, the courts were already directly applying Spanish law as 
they also did in Cottin, and, interestingly, no attention or objection 
is drawn to this in the cases. It is done in an atmosphere of normal 
operating procedure.  
The question becomes, therefore, not whether Cottin marked 
the first use of the digest methodology––certainly it was not––but 
rather to ask, What made the Cottin decision so noteworthy to 
contemporaries and What made it so consequential for the later 
history of this subject? It is from that date forward that the 
translation of the Partidas into English was decided upon, and it 
probably clinched the decision to enter upon a second round of 
codification. 
In my judgment, there was something special and deeply 
unsettling about the decision, but it was not the novelty of the 
digest method. This decision showed more graphically than any 
prior decision that even the most precise rules set forth in the 
Digest––whether they be those establishing the age of majority, or 
the length of a prescriptive period, or, as here, the definition of an 
abortive child––might all be subject to some modification or 
supplementation after consultation with the background law.  
The legislative technique displayed in a civil code, C.J. 
Morrow once noted, establishes norms along a spectrum that 
ranges from very precise rules, to more flexible and supple rules, 
and on to general principles. It is, notably, those very precise rules 
that are most conducive to deductive reasoning and that will 
produce the most predictable and certain outcomes. Yet, when the 
court reconfigured the definition of an abortive child to coincide 
with Spanish law, the court demonstrated that not even the most 
detailed provisions in the Digest could be regarded as incontestable 
or safe from revision.46 Even a definition could be redefined under 
the digest methodology. Here was a staggering blow to legal 
certainty and to the reliance that the citizenry could place in the 
published laws that they were expected to know––for if the 
clearest, most detailed laws prove uncertain, what can be expected 
to happen to its more numerous general provisions? The rock 
submerged in the pail of water would seem to have turned into a 
                                                                                                             
 
See Archives of the Spanish Government of West Florida, West Florida Papers, 
no. 110, 288–89 (in translation) (on file with the Louisiana Collection, Howard 
Tilton Library, Tulane University). 
 46. Perhaps the case also attracted attention because it affected conservative 
values about inheritance and family, and the Spanish rule was idiosyncratic and 
had no equivalent in European family law. 
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sponge.47 The sponge would seem adrift and not the center of 
anything. 
From the beginning, this method had continually marginalized 
the Digest, and it often led the judges to go straight to Spanish, 
French, or Roman authority with only a passing glance, if any, at 
the Digest itself. A representative case is one in which the question 
was whether a purchaser of land could suspend payment of the 
purchase price on grounds that he was in danger of eviction.48 The 
particular danger alleged by the plaintiff was the existence of an 
unsatisfied mortgage on the land, which the seller had not paid and 
for which he was not in default. Under the Digest, a danger of 
eviction meant some disturbance of the purchaser’s possession by 
an “action” taken or filed against him, and nothing of that sort had 
occurred. But the court never cited, quoted, or discussed the 
Digest. It held for the purchaser by relying upon Domat and 
Justinian’s Digest for the proposition that the mere existence of the 
mortgage created a danger of eviction.49 Another case illustrating 
the marginalization of the Digest involved whether a will was valid 
if a witness was absent when the testator dictated his intentions to 
the notary.50 In reaching its decision, the court did not cite or quote 
the Digest provisions. It said merely that the Digest was in 
agreement with the Spanish law that the witnesses must be present 
at that moment. It quoted Febrero’s statement that they must “all at 
one and the same time hear the words from the mouth of the 
testator.”51 Over and over, the cases give the impression that the 
Digest is secondary authority compared to the ius commune 
surrounding it. 
                                                                                                             
 47. Or as François-Xavier Martin phrased it: 
In practice, the work was used, as an incomplete digest of existing 
statutes, which still retained their empire; and their exceptions and 
modifications were held to affect several clauses by which former 
principles were absolutely stated. Thus, the people found a decoy, in what 
was held out as a beacon. 
2 FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, THE HISTORY OF LOUISIANA, FROM THE EARLIEST 
PERIOD 291–92 (1829) (emphasis added). 
 48. See Duplantier v. Pigman, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 236 (La. 1814). 
 49. Id. at 244. 
 50. Knight v. Smith, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 156 (La. 1813). For a further example of 
marginalization, see Jacob v. Ursuline Nuns, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 269 (La. 1812) (A 
plantation overseer, a free person of color, worked for a number of years without 
wages. The nuns attempted to reward him by donating two arpents of land, but 
this was held to be beyond their authority and right. Further, he was not entitled 
to recover the reasonable amount of his services in “quantum meruit,” but the 
court did not examine the Digest provisions on natural obligations or quasi-
contracts. It relied on an English case denying quantum meruit under similar 
circumstances.).  
 51. Id. at 167. 
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Furthermore, the judges could often control outcomes under 
the digest method at their discretion. The linchpin of the method 
was actually judicial control over the issue of repeal. And much 
depended upon the principles of repeal that they entertained. 
Certainly, no teleological construction of “contrariness” based on 
what end the code was meant to accomplish was ever raised. The 
courts were wedded to a most literal and conservative theory of 
repeal, drawn word-for-word from British decisions and authors 
who were emphatic that implied repeals of prior statutes were 
disfavored. Application of this British view favored the maximum 
retention of old Spanish law because it read the implied repeal 
clause as narrowly as possible. For example, Judge Mathews in De 
Armas’ Case (1821) said that, to decide whether an 1813 contempt 
statute abrogated the Spanish laws on attorney discipline, it was 
necessary to resort to “known and established rules of abrogation 
and repeal.”52 He set forth three known and established rules, but 
interestingly, he did not disclose where these principles came from. 
Research shows that they were in fact rules for the repeal of 
common law statutes drawn from common law books. The favorite 
sources were William Blackstone, Matthew Bacon’s Abridgement, 
and English precedents.53 It is also important to note how 
unpredictable the question of repeal could be. Litigants could never 
be really sure when the court would say that Spanish law had been 
repealed and when it remained in force. As stated previously, the 
test of “contrariness,” or repugnancy, was generally construed as 
strictly as possible to maintain the exterior Spanish law in force, 
but sometimes it was applied loosely and purposively to strike 
down certain disliked or inconvenient Spanish rules. The factors 
behind the differing outcomes were not articulated.54 Clearly, this 
interpretational discretion enhanced judicial power. 
                                                                                                             
 52. See De Armas’ Case, 10 Mart. (o.s.) 158, 172 (La. 1821).  
 53. Thus, in Rogers v. Beiller, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 665 (La. 1815), Judge Martin 
referred to Matthew Bacon’s A New Abridgment of the Law and Lord 
Mansfield’s decision in The Earl of Ailesbury v. Pattison (1778). See id. at 672. 
 54. For example, the “decisory oath,” which existed in Louisiana during the 
Spanish occupation, was peremptorily declared “virtually” repealed by procedural 
rules under the Practice Act simply because the Practice Act allowed 
interrogatories to be directed to the opposite party in the case. Actually, however, 
there is no necessary incompatibility between sending written interrogatories to 
the party and deferring a decisory oath to that same party. Answering the decisory 
oath may have conclusive effects on the outcome of the case, but there is no 
reason why both the decisory oath and written interrogatories could not be used at 
different stages of the same proceedings. They represent different ways of 
obtaining party evidence and of assigning weight to it. In the event, however, the 
superior court summarily declared that the decisory oath was repealed without 
explaining why. Porche’s Heirs v. Poydras, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 198 (La. 1811). Cottin v. 
814 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
IV. A CODA ON THE DIGEST 
The inner connection between maintaining Spanish law through 
the digest method and maintaining the court’s own power became 
more obvious over time. Matters came to a head in the second round 
of codification from 1823–1828 when the Legislature attempted 
mightily to sever the Spanish umbilical cord. The three jurisconsults 
expressed forcefully in their preliminary report that it was necessary 
to repeal “all former laws and usages defining civil rights.”55 A 
Code article drafted by the senate itself contained a comprehensive 
and definitive repeal of all prior laws:  
From and after the promulgation of this code, the Spanish, 
Roman and French laws, which were in force in this State, 
when Louisiana was ceded to the United States . . . are 
hereby repealed in every case, for which it has been 
especially provided in this code, and that they shall not be 
invoked as laws, even under the pretense that their 
provisions are not contrary or repugnant to those of this 
code.56  
Despite the comprehensiveness of this repeal and the advance 
warning against judicial “pretense,” the judges of the supreme 
court obstinately refused to give full effect to it. In a series of 
decisions in 1827, the court ruled that Spanish custom was still 
controlling, in another that the Partidas was still controlling, and in 
a third it ruled that the new Civil Code of 1825 had not succeeded 
                                                                                                             
 
Cottin also illustrates the discretionary element in the repeal question. 5 Mart. 
(o.s.) 93 (La. 1817). Counsel pointed out that under Spanish law, the baptism of a 
child, even one that did not survive 24 hours, prevented it from being considered 
as abortive. He also pointed out that Spanish law’s use of this religious rite as an 
element in its rule made it expressly contrary to the Digest’s definition, which 
made no reference to baptism. The court, however, brushed aside this disparity 
and did not think that the Spanish rule was sufficiently contrary to be regarded as 
repealed. Id. See also Rogers v. Beiller, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 665 (La. 1815). 
 55. See Tucker, supra note 3, at 179 (Preliminary Report of the Code 
Commissioners, dated February 13, 1823). 
 56. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3521 (1825). This amendment passed overwhelmingly 
in the House of Representatives by a vote of 26–2, with the majority comprised 
equally (judging by their surnames) between Creole and American 
representatives. LA. H.R. JOURNAL, 2d Sess., at 10 (Mar. 13, 1824). A further 
amendment, weakening the first, was proposed and defeated by a vote of 18 to 
6. This amendment would have permitted the Spanish, French, Roman, and 
common law to be used for illustrating the principles of the code. The “no” vote 
was again evenly comprised of Creole and American names. Cf. RICHARD 
KILBOURNE, A HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: THE FORMATIVE 
YEARS, 1803–1839 (1987).  
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even in repealing certain provisions of the Digest and therefore the 
Digest provisions were concurrently in force.57 The Legislature 
now felt called upon to respond and to reassert the repeal in more 
forceful and particularized terms. It passed a first act specifically 
repealing all articles contained in the Digest of 180858 and then 
passed a second act declaring “that all of the civil laws which were 
in force before the promulgation of the civil code lately 
promulgated, be and are hereby abrogated.”59 Once again, the 
judges remained intransigent and resorted to disingenuous 
arguments to block the repeal. They now insisted that their own 
precedents and legal decisions, if based upon “general principles” 
of the civil law rather than statutes, were immune from the effects 
of the omnibus repeal issued by the Legislature. Accordingly, they 
held that a doctrine founded on Roman principles, which the court 
had previously recognized in a case, was still controlling even after 
the repeal of 1828.60 The court reasoned that legislative power 
cannot extend beyond the laws which the legislature itself 
had enacted; for it is this alone which it may repeal; eodem 
modo quiquit constitutur, eodem modo dissolvitur. . . . We, 
therefore, conclude, that the Spanish, Roman, and French 
civil laws, which the legislature repealed, are the positive, 
written, or statute laws of those nations, and of this state 
[and] that the legislature did not intend to abrogate those 
principles of law which had been established or settled by 
the decisions of courts of justice.61  
                                                                                                             
 57. See Broussard v. Bernard, 7 La. 211 (La. 1834) (decided in 1827 but not 
reported until 1834); Erwin v. Fenwick, 6 Mart. (n.s.) 229 (La. 1827); Lacroix v. 
Coquet, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 527 (La. 1827); Flower v. Griffith, 6 Mart. (n.s.) 89 (La. 
1827). 
 58. Act No. 40, 1828 La. Acts 66. 
 59. Act No. 83, 1828 La. Acts 160. 
 60. See Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 193 (La. 1839). The earlier case alluded 
to was Christy v. Cazenave, 2 Mart. (n.s.) 451 (La. 1824), which recognized on 
the basis of Roman principles the doctrine of abandonment in the law of lease. 
This claim of immunity from legislative power clearly surpassed the claim that 
decisions have precedential effect for judges and should not be lightly overruled. 
While the former may have been unusually radical, the latter view was advanced 
frequently enough. See Dugas v. Estiletts, 5 La. Ann. 559, 559–60 (La. 1850) 
(citation omitted) (“But the most distinguished of our predecessors have, in two 
cases, come to a different conclusion, and based their opinions upon those of our 
earliest commentators on the laws of redhibition. In the interpretation of a law, it 
is a wise rule, ‘stare decisis,’ and we are obliged to adopt it in this case.”). 
 61. Reynolds, 13 La. at 198. The court also deemed the Louisiana Legislature 
impotent to repeal the revealed law, the natural law, the law of nations and those 
laws “antecedent to any positive precept.” Id. 
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 It could be said that this was a struggle over the lawmaking 
power and over the court’s jurisprudence, but in my view it was 
about the centrality of the civil code in the legal order. There was a 
deep fear of a code on its own bottom, bereft of any safety net. 
This seems to have been the fear of Etienne Mazureau, who 
recounted the story of the repeal to Alexis de Tocqueville on his 
visit to New Orleans: “The bar and the judges discovered with 
horror what had been done the day before. But the thing was 
done.”62 What had really been done was of course not an evil or a 
horror but the final demise of the digest method. It marked a great 
turning point in the history of our Civil Code. 
Ladies and gentlemen, perhaps I have gone far enough with 
this story to make my thesis clear that the honorable judges were 
resolute defenders of their methods, their powers, and their offices. 
They clung to the old law, particularly the parts now embodied in 
their own jurisprudence, as they might have clung to their own 
possessions. It was indeed a shocked Judge Mathews who 
expressed his true feelings about the propriety of the great repeal: 
The clause of repeal is sweeping in its effects, tremendously 
sweeping, and an unwise or inconsiderate interpretation on the 
part of the courts of justice, would have left the community 
without any civil laws, except those contained in the 
Louisiana Code and Code of Practice; an evil so great as to be 
irreconcilable with the wisdom that must be conceded to our 
legislatures.63  
And yet, this was surely the turning point in the quest to implant 
a true code in Louisiana. It is important to realize what the old order 
was actually defending. They preferred the freedom of the open 
spaces and fluid, plural sources of Spanish, French, and common 
law. If discretion means the power to choose, they were in a sense 
defending their own discretionary powers and resisting a legislative 
bridle. Possibly the Spanish–Roman–French ius commune seemed 
to them a more prestigious system of justice, nobler and better tested 
than anything they believed that the Louisiana Legislature might 
enact. But, in my opinion, in the final analysis, they were 
unconsciously defending what we all defend every day in our legal 
lives—our acquired legal culture. The judges and lawyers had 
acquired their expensive libraries and mastered these laws and, in 
the process, proudly identified with them. They had become, in fact, 
                                                                                                             
 62. Tucker, supra note 3, at 169 (quoting DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 
106). 
 63. Testamentary Ex’r of Lewis v. Casenave, 6 La. 437, 441 (La. 1834) 
(emphasis added). 
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expert comparatists who made an eclectic synthesis of the law to a 
degree seldom seen before or since. The judges felt threatened by 
the Legislature’s omnibus repeal of the very sources upon which 
their whole jurisprudence of the past 20 years rested. From 1825 on, 
the Legislature apparently expected the judges to accept the Civil 
Code as the one and only source of civil law. For the coequal 
judicial branch of government, this seemed an uncomfortable and 
undignified straitjacket. Their creativity would be reduced to 
analogical paths within a single code rather than the freedom to 
apply the justice of laws which lay beyond it. Of what use would 
their learning be if it could only be deployed in the intellectual 
isolation of a true civil code? What would be left of their former 
liberty to seek and to find just rules from every part of the world?  
Ladies and gentlemen, my time has indeed expired, and I have 
not reached other episodes in this history that I intended to present. 
They would have added to the evidence of the struggle to place our 
civil code in the center of our system, but that is for another day. 
Napoleon once said of the renowned Portalis that “Portalis would 
be the most eloquent of speakers if he only knew when to stop.” I 
must reluctantly obey the Emperor and break off here.  
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APPENDIX A: THE ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE CIVIL LAW 
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Commerical 
Law 
(uncodified) 
Criminal 
Law & 
Criminal 
Procedure 
(Two 
Statutes) 
Civil Codes 
(Private 
Law) 
Civil 
Procedure 
(The 
Practice 
Act 1805) 
Sources: The English & 
U.S. Law Merchant U.S. 
Crim. Law (and Ord. de 
Bilbao).  
Sources: English & U.S. Crim. 
Law (but Slave crimes: Span. 
Crim. Law) (1805 Act specifically 
to be construed in Common Law 
of England). 
Sources: The Digest and 
Spanish, French, Roman Civil 
law (and by seepage, Anglo-
American Law). 
Sources: Mixture of English, 
U.S., and Spanish law; 
Prerogative Writs (Quo 
Warranto, Mandamus, 
Prohibition, Procedendo, Habeas 
Corpus) as “prescribed by the 
common law.” 
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APPENDIX B: ROCK IN A PAIL OF WATER 
 
 
  
